In Korea, many nuclear power plants operate at a single site based on geographical characteristics, but the population density near the sites is higher than that in other countries.
Introduction
Since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, simultaneous failures of NPPs at a single site have become a serious public concern for nuclear safety. The major difference in the Fukushima accident compared with other severe accidents was that it was the first event affecting multiunits by a single event.
There is the possibility of multiunit accidents because most sites in the world have more than two units. However, these events have been ignored owing to the recognition that their occurrence frequency may be considerably low. In Korea, many nuclear power plants operate at a single site based on geographical characteristics, but the population density near the sites is higher than that in other countries. Thus, multiunit accidents are a more important consideration than in other countries and should be appropriately addressed.
The major purpose of a multiunit probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is to improve safety, in terms of the site, by identifying the vulnerabilities of the site and providing solutions to them. Currently, a multiunit PSA has many issues, for example, identification and evaluation of multiunit initiating events, interunit common cause failure, and a multiunit offsite consequence analysis. To address these issues, many studies have been performed around the world.
Quantification of a multiunit model is also a significant issue. There are three limitations of a traditional method in quantifying a multiunit model: (1) many accident sequence combinations; (2) the need for a low truncation limit; and (3) approximation such as rare event approximation (REA) and minimal cut upper bound (MCUB).
The purpose of this study was to develop a quantification method for a multiunit accident. This paper presents our quantification method, which is based on the Monte Carlo sampling. The method can consider all possible combinations in a multiunit site and calculate their probability. As an example, a seismic-induced multiunit accident was assessed. The quantification method based on a Monte Carlo approach has several benefits, which are as follows: -All possible accident sequence combinations can be identified by sampling the results. -The approach can be applied regardless of the number of units and plant types. -It can calculate a more exact value for events that have high failure probability such as seismic-induced component failure compared with the failure of a traditional quantification method, such as the MCUB or REA method.
In Section 2, a brief history and some studies related to a multiunit PSA are reviewed to show the current status. Section 3 gives detailed descriptions of the limitations. The multiunit quantification method proposed in this study is described in Section 4. Finally, an example of a multiunit model for seismic events is quantified to confirm the applicability of the proposed method.
2.
Review of multiunit PSA
The first application of a multiunit risk assessment was the Seabrook probabilistic risk assessment [1] . In this assessment, multiunit initiating events, including a loss of off-site poser, truck crash, and seismic event, were considered and assessed using an event tree for two units at the Seabrook site. Moreover, Japan has considered a multiunit accident caused by a seismic event in the past. Hakata [2] suggested the seismic PSA method for multiple nuclear power plants. He considered multivariate correlations of components and systems from partial to complete, inside and across the units. Then, a sample analysis and sensitivity studies were performed in his study.
After the Fukushima accident, multiunit PSA was more highlighted than in the past. Currently, there are various issues related to multiunit risk and PSA, which are as follows:
-Classification and identification of multiunit initiating events -Estimation of multiunit initiating event frequency -Quantification for a multiunit PSA model -Multiunit off-site consequence analysis -Common cause failure (CCF) by multiunit dependencies To solve these issues, there have been many studies related to multiunit risk and PSA [3e7]. Schroer and Modarres [8] suggested event classification schema to evaluate the site risk. They identified six main dependence classifications and analyzed the licensee event reports that were submitted to the U.S. NRC to verify the proposed classification.
Ebisawa et al. [9] proposed a concept and method to evaluate a multiunit core damage frequency (CDF) considering a failure correlation. A seismic event is a major initiator that can extensively and concurrently affect the site. If a seismic event occurs at a certain site, the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) could have failed by the seismic correlation. This correlation is an important technical issue in single-unit and multiunit PSAs, and has been studied for a long time [4, 10] . In Ebisawa et al.'s [9] study, a procedure used to evaluate the failure and response correlation coefficient between SSCs was developed and applied to the calculation for a two-unit CDF. In addition, many studies have been carried out internationally.
3.
Limitations of traditional methods for quantifying a multiunit PSA model Generally, a traditional quantification method of a PSA model for a nuclear power plant is performed by generating minimal cut sets based on a Boolean manipulation of fault tree and quantifying them using an approximation method such as REA or MCUB. However, there are some limitations in quantifying a multiunit PSA model. In this section, we define the issues for the quantification of a multiunit PSA model and summarize the problems of traditional methods.
Issues
In terms of multiunit risk and PSA, the quantification for all accident sequence combinations between units at a site is a significant issue. In a traditional PSA, it is assumed that all initiating events are independent. This means that more than two initiating events do not occur concurrently. In addition, all possible accident sequences of each initiating event are independent. In other words, each sequence in a single unit is mutually exclusive. Thus, the quantification is performed by identifying all the accident sequences and summing their values. This series of processes is performed under the assumption that other units apart from the target unit are safe.
If multiunit accidents such as the Fukushima-type accident occur, multiple units at the same site can concurrently experience core damage. Each unit also has many different sequences according to whether or not the safety system is successful, as shown in Fig. 1 .
Hence, there are various combinations. This means that the core damage to an individual unit is not mutually exclusive from other units. For a simple example, core damage events (CE), including all possible combinations for a given site that has three units, can be illustrated as shown in Fig. 2 .
In accordance with Boolean algebra, the CE of Unit 1 in Fig. 2 can be decomposed into four mutually exclusive events and represented as follows:
In a traditional PSA, all terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (1) were addressed as the same event because the states of other units were not considered. However, the consequences of these events are practically different from each other. Hence, they have to be considered to estimate the multiunit risk.
Limitations of traditional methods
Traditional methods have some limitations in quantifying a multiunit PSA model. First, it is difficult to construct a multiunit model to identify all possible combinations. In the case of some initiating events assessed in a single-unit PSA, the number of accident sequences could be more than 100 according to whether or not the safety systems are successful. All possible accident sequences in a single-unit can be written by Eq. (2):
where F i is an accident sequence in the i th unit, IE i;j is the j th initiating event of the i th unit, S i;j;k is the k th accident sequence of the j th initiating event in the i th unit, nIE is the total number of initiating events in the i th unit, nS is the number of sequences of a given initiating event, AS i;j is the j th accident sequence in the i th unit, and nAS is the total number of accident sequences in the i th unit. Using Eq. (2), all possible site Fig. 1 e All possible core damage cases in a two-unit site. N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 7 1 0 e7 2 0 accident sequences can be modified and extended for an arbitrary number of units:
where CS m is the accident sequence combinations for m out of n units at a site. Depending on various values of the subscript m, the combinations between each unit can be represented as follows:For m ¼ 2,
In accordance with the above equation, the number of CS increases exponentially by adding the number of units. To represent Eq. (4) in a traditional manner, a multiunit model may be formed as shown in Fig. 3 .
Even if there are only two units at a site, it is not easy to model, as shown in Fig. 3 . Moreover, in the case of Korea, which has more than six units at a particular site, it is practically difficult to represent the model considering all combinations.
Another limitation of traditional methods is the use of approximations in the quantification. Generally, the MCUB and REA methods are used to calculate the CDF in a single-unit PSA. However, it is well known that these methods have overestimated the value when the probability of an event is significantly large [11] . For most external hazards, especially seismic events, results of the quantification using MCUB and REA can have an overestimated value because many events have a high failure probability. For this issue, Han et al. [12] conducted a comparison of various methods to quantify a fault tree for a seismic PSA. In this study, quantification for an example model, which has a high probability of events, was performed using REA, MCUB, bianry decision diagrams (BDD), and Monte Carlo. The results of this study showed that quantification using the Monte Carlo approach can produce a more exact value than that of a traditional method in a seismic PSA.
4.
Quantification method for a multiunit PSA model using the Monte Carlo approach
The Monte Carlo method for quantification of a multiunit PSA model was used in this study. The proposed method based on the Monte Carlo approach has certain benefits. It can identify and estimate all possible sequence combinations and also calculate a more exact value for several events than that of a traditional method. Hence, the proposed method can be applied to certain initiating events, which include events the probabilities of which are large.
This method consists of four steps: (1) development of a multiunit PSA model including a list of single unit accident sequences; (2) Monte Carlo sampling; (3) recording of the failure of a top event and accident sequence; and (4) postprocessing of the sampling result / calculation of the conditional core damage probability (CCDP). Fig. 4 shows a flowchart of this method. Detailed descriptions of each step are given in the following sections.
4.1.
Development of a multiunit model
We developed a multiunit model by modifying and extending a single-unit model. A single-unit model has to include a list of all possible accident sequences in each unit. Fig. 5 shows a Fig. 3 e Structure of a multi-unit PSA model to identify all possible accident sequences.
simple structure of a multiunit model to help understand this. In a practical assessment, the sequences have to be decomposed according to Eq. (4). In other words, based on Boolean algebra, the model was developed to make all combinations of accident sequences a set of mutually exclusive events. The dependencies and/or correlations were also modeled in this step. The basic concept is that the failures of components by dependencies are connected with existing basic events that are expected to have interunit dependencies. Fig. 6 shows a simple example of a two-unit site.
Monte Carlo simulation and record of the failure
The states of all basic events in a multiunit model are randomly determined, and the state of the top event (true or false) is finally calculated according to Boolean operators. All failed accident sequences, which are generated through Monte Carlo sampling in each run, are recorded in the result. In other words, the gate names of each sequence are recorded in the result file. Using these results, CCDPs of each sequence are calculated. Figs. 7 and 8 show the process of a failure record and an example of the results. For further support, Run 4, which was the fourth sampling result, means that the core damage occurred in two units of the site, and the SLOCA-07 sequence occurred concurrently in both Units 2 and 4.
Estimation of multiunit accident sequence probability and multiunit CDF
The final step is to calculate the CCDP of each accident sequence. Using the result of the Monte Carlo sampling, all possible combinations can be identified. We can then estimate the CCDP for all of them.
The counting rule makes each sequence combination mutually exclusive among the other sequence combinations. This prevents an overlap in which the number of occurrences of a certain sequence combination is counted more than once. For further support, using a Venn diagram, all possible sampling cases of core damage can be illustrated as in Fig. 2 . In Unit 1, the failure count (FC) of the core damage can be written as follows:
Although four sampling cases represent the occurrence of core damage in Unit 1, note that the above sampling cases are different sequences in terms of a multiunit PSA, as mentioned in Section 3. Thus, each combination is classified by the group that has the same off-site consequence. For example, the total number of occurrences of core damage for one out of three units in Fig. 2 can be represented through the following equation:
Based on the counting rule, the CCDPs for all accident sequence combinations are calculated by the following equation:
where TCCDP k is the total CCDP for k out of n units, CCDP k;l is the CCDP of the l th multiunit (k out of n units) accident sequence, FC k;l is the number of samples for the l th multiunit (k units) accident sequence, nC is the number of multiunit (k out of n units) accident sequences, and nMC is the number of Monte Carlo samples. Based on Eq. (2), the final form of the multiunit CDF for k out of n units can be written as follows:
where fIE MU is the frequency of a multiunit initiating event. N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 7 1 0 e7 2 0 N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 7 1 0 e7 2 0
5.

Application to example model
In this section, the example model, which has six identical units at a site, was quantified to confirm the applicability of the proposed method. A sensitivity study was also performed to check the effect of the CCF. Note that the model assessed in this study uses examples that take into account various conservative assumptions. In other words, there is no relationship between the practical model and the example model used in this section. Thus, the results described here alone are lacking in certain insights.
5.1.
Multiunit seismic model Generally, the CDF in a seismic PSA is evaluated by the following equation [13] :
where HðaÞ is a seismic hazard, PðaÞ is the CCDP under seismic conditions, and a is the peak ground acceleration (PGA). If a certain PGA is assumed, Eq. (9) can be simplified as follows:
where %H is a seismic hazard at a certain PGA, and P CD is the CCDP at a certain PGA. The CCDP, P CD in Eq. (10), can be divided into two parts (the seismic-induced initiating event and the accident sequence of each initiating event) as follows:
where P i is the i th seismic-induced initiating event probability under seismic conditions, and S i;j is the j th accident sequence probability in the i th initiating event. If there are n identical units at the site, the final form of the seismic-induced multiunit CDF (MUCDF) for k out of n units can be written as follows:
where MUCDF k is the CDF of k out of n units, P l;m is the m th initiating event in the l th unit, and S l;m;n is the n th accident sequence of the m th initiating event in the l th unit. Fig. 9 shows the structure of quantification for a multiunit seismic model based on Eq. (12).
Quantification results
In this study, we used Monte Carlo software, FTeMC [14] , which was developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. The number of samples for the base case of the Fig. 8 e Example of Monte Carlo sampling result. Fig. 9 e Structure of quantification for a multi-unit seismic model.
N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 7 1 0 e7 2 0 example model was 106. Fig. 10 and Table 1 show the results for k out of n units and the detailed results, which are higher than 0.1% of the total FC. The CCDP of each sequence was estimated using Eq. (7). In the results, one unit sequence was dominant because the example mode assumed that each unit is independent.
Sensitivity study
The sensitivity study was performed to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method for taking into account dependencies between units. We chose two kinds of dependencies for the sensitivity study. The first was the failure of safety SSCs. In a seismic event, it is known that the failure of the SSCs may have some dependencies such as hazard intensity and response [10] . These dependencies could cause a CCF of SSCs in both intraunits and interunits because all the units at the same site are concurrently exposed to the same stresses by the common seismic effect. Thus, this is an important issue in a seismic PSA and so is being studied actively around the world [9] . The other kind of dependence was seismic-induced initiating events. As shown in Fig. 9 , NPPs can experience various seismic-induced initiating events such as loss of coolant accident (LOCA), loss of off-site power (LOOP), and total loss of component cooling water (TLOCCW) when a seismic event occurs at a site. In other words, a seismic-induced initiating event of each unit at the same site can be the same or different. Moreover, the impact of dependencies between mitigation systems can have a large difference according to whether or not initiating events of each unit are the same. For this reason, dependencies between initiating events were also a major consideration. The CCF factors we used in this study were imaginary values because the purpose of the sensitivity study was to simply check their effect, and the evaluation of the CCF was not within the scope of this study. Our method of applying a CCF to a multiunit model has been described in Section 4.1. In case of seismic events, failure of components is represented by Eq. (13):
where BE is a failure by randomness, SE is a failure by seismic event, and SE_dependency is a failure by the dependency (seismic correlation). For safety SSCs, we considered the five major components that had the most dominant effect in the single-unit model. Four cases were assessed for the sensitivity study.
-Case 1: no CCF between units (base case) -Case 2: CCF considered in only seismic-induced initiating events -Case 3: CCF considered in both seismic-induced IE and SSCs -Case 4: CCF considered in SSCs only Fig. 11 shows five high-ranking sequences of multiple units. Figs. 12 and 13 show, respectively, the top sequence for three and four out of six units. Fig. 14 and Table 1 show the CCDP as a function of the number of units. In the case of combinations consisting of the same sequence, the results had a large difference according to whether or not CCF was Fig. 10 e Results of quantification for the example model. applied to the model. By contrast, the CCF effect in combinations including the other sequences had only a few changes. The results can be summarized as follows:
-With more than three units, the CCF effect increased.
-The effect of the CCF applied to the initiating event was larger than that of the CCF applied to the SSCs. However, because the CCF of the SSCs was considered in only five major components, an additional assessment should be conducted. Fig. 12 e CCDP of top sequence for three out of six units. Fig. 11 e CCDP of top sequence of multiunit.
N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 7 1 0 e7 2 0 -It is practically impossible to consider the CCF for all components. Thus, adequate screening criteria will be needed. -In this analysis, we cannot exactly calculate the sequence combinations that have a probability of less than 10Ee6 because the number of samples was 10 6 . To calculate such a low probability of sequence combinations, the sampling times should be increased.
Conclusion
Identification of all accident sequence combinations between units at a site and their quantification are significant issues in a multiunit PSA. In this study, we proposed a quantification method based on the Monte Carlo approach for quantification of a multiunit PSA model. The N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 7 1 0 e7 2 0
proposed quantification method has the following benefits:
-It can identify all combinations regardless of the number of units. -Regardless of the fact that all units at the site were assumed to be identical in this study, the proposed method can be used when there are various types of plants at a site. -If a single-unit model for some initiating events exists, it can be applied to every initiating event. -It can calculate a more exact value for several initiating events, which include events with large probabilities.
Although the proposed method has various benefits, its limitations included obtaining detailed information such as the minimal cut set. When information regarding the minimal cut set is required, it is necessary to review the cut set of a single unit model.
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